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a  b  s t  r a c  t
This paper addresses  key implications  in momentous  current  global  energy choices  – both for  social  sci-
ence  and for society.  Energy  can be  over-used  as a lens  for  viewing social  processes.  But  it  is nonetheless  of
profound importance. Understanding possible ‘sustainable  energy’ transformations  requires  attention to
many tricky  issues  in  social  theory:  around agency and  structure  and  the  interplay of power,  contingency
and  practice. These factors  are  as  much  shaping of the knowledges  and normativities  supposedly driving
transformation,  as they are  shaped  by  them. So,  ideas and  hopes  about possible  pathways for  change  –
as  well  as  notions  of ‘the transition’ itself –  can  be  deeply  constituted  by  incumbent  interests. The  paper
addresses  these  dynamics by  considering  contending  forms  of transformation  centring on renewable
energy, nuclear power and climate geoengineering.  Several  challenges  are  identified for  social  science.
These  apply  especially  where  there  are  aims to help enable  more democratic  exercise of  social  agency.
They  enjoin responsibilities  to  ‘open  up’  (rather than ‘close down’),  active political  spaces  for  critical  con-
tention  over alternative  pathways. If  due attention  is  to be  given to marginalised  interests,  then  a  reflexive
view must  be  taken of  transformation.  The paper ends with  a series  of concrete  political lessons.
©  2014  The Author.  Published by  Elsevier Ltd. This  is an  open access  article  under the CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Transformation and power
The advent of this journal is  propitious. And this is not  just
for the relatively small community of researchers engaged specif-
ically in social scientific study of energy systems. There has long
been recognition for the role of social research in  energy stud-
ies [1] and there can be little doubt of its importance [2]. But
the reverse is also true. Of the many expediently segregated –
but intimately interconnected [3,4] – functional ‘sectors’ of socio-
economic life (like water, food and shelter), there is also a  sense
in which none are more significant to general development of
social science at large – or indeed society itself – than is ‘energy’
[5–7].
It is the ‘energy sector’, after all, that currently stands most
momentously at a  historic “crossroads” [8]: wrangling over a
prospective globally concerted transformation away from fos-
sil carbon infrastructures [9,10].  This  is not just an intractable
technical undertaking [11].  It  is also a  monumental cultural and
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political challenge [12],  with outcomes highly sensitive to dis-
parate imaginations of the world and of the place of humanity
within this [13,14].  The subjective perspectives under which these
issues are analysed and understood, can be as important as the
objective developments themselves [15].  However viewed, though,
a conjunction of extraordinary pressures is  briefly opening a  rare
‘window of opportunity’ [16], through which the re-structuring of
large-scale, long-lived ‘sociotechnical regimes’ may  be unusually
sensitive equally to  human agency and historical contingency [17].
So, contemporary developments specifically bearing on the
energy sector, may  in complex, nonlinear ways help yield poten-
tially profound importance for the more general constituting of
future global societies [18].  And understandings of these social
dynamics and their possible consequences and drivers depend
on – and carry under-appreciated implications for – some of  the
most fundamental themes in  social science as a  whole [15,19].
These include: relations between agency and structure; the
shaping of knowledges and normativities and the interplay of
power, contingency and practice [20]. Here, as elsewhere, it may
be that the most rigorously formative influences on academic
activity and the quality of the results, might not be the ‘internal’
procedures of institutionalised disciplines, but the ‘external’
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.001
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transdisciplinary challenges of sincere efforts to effect real-world
change [21,22].
At the outset, then, this raises demanding questions over what
in this context might be  meant by ‘power’. One way  or  another,
it is through various kinds of power dynamics, that any social
transformation comes to be realised or  suppressed [23]. But power
is a notoriously slippery concept, which deserves to be clarified
right from the start. In colloquial terms, power is  about the
exercise of some form of social control [24].  But  ‘control’ is barely
less enigmatic [24,25] – also introducing immediate queries over
the constituting and bounding of chains of causes, consequences,
intentions and collateral effects [26]. In what sense might long
run energy futures meaningfully be considered a category even
susceptible to ‘control’ [27,28]? If so, where does the buck stop in
tracing drivers and implications [29]? Under what notions of inten-
tionality [30]? And who is the ‘we’ doing the controlling [31:186]?
After all, when has humanity as a whole even undertaken – let
alone controlled, still less achieved – any single explicitly and
collectively deliberate end at all?
Even in relatively straightforward organisational settings, sim-
ple deterministic pictures of control can be  problematic. And
they are often better understood more as instrumental fictions
necessary for the assertion of privilege, than as disinterested
accounts of actuality [32–36].  When stripped of this expedi-
ency, many real-world instances of ‘control’ can decompose into
complex conditions of diverse mutually adapting intentionalities
and (in)tractabilities. And the possibilities of many alternative
accountings for causality among proliferating multitudes of nested
implicated factors, leaves any particular tracing of control sig-
nificantly in the eye of the beholder [37].  In  energy futures as
elsewhere, then, care must be taken that analysis of social dynam-
ics does not – under instrumental pressure of patronage to “see like
a state” [38] – simply entrench and perpetuate misleading ‘fallacies
of control’ [39]. Such reinforcing of incumbency can all-too-easily
lead to the opposite of transformation.
This is at least as true in  wider governance, as it is within organi-
sations [35,40]. And, crucially, it applies as much when contemplat-
ing the exercise of democratic, as of autocratic, power in ‘social con-
trol’ [28].  In other words, even in  the constituting of the concepts
themselves, incumbency has a  habit of subverting understandings
of ‘power’ and ‘control’ [41,42]. History provides many examples
where ostensibly revolutionary efforts to overturn incumbency
simply reproduce it in another form – often more entrenched
[43–45]. If it is to  help effect real socio-political change of the
depth and scale envisaged, then, serious consideration of the social
dynamics of energy transformation, should not fall into this trap.
In order to address these difficulties, then, ‘power’ might better
be addressed in a more nuanced and qualified guise: as ‘asymmetri-
cally structured agency’. Here, ‘agency’ refers to the many different
kinds of capacity involved in shaping and performing (rather than
controlling) social action [24].  Such asymmetries are constituted by
diverse distributions in many social modes [46], media [47],  levels
[48], relations [49,50],  fields [51] and forms of capability [52].  In
all these senses, though, agency (and so power) can be recognised
as inherently more dynamic, relational and distributed, than it is
specifically located [53]. And there are recursively co-constituting
– i.e.: “reflexive” [54] – relations with intentionality [55],  discourse
[56], normativity [57] and political and economic interests [58].  It
is these that make so problematic, any simple notion of deliberately
controlled social transformation.
So, this understanding of power as asymmetries in  flows of
social agency has important practical implications for global energy
transformation. And these are as salient to  understandings, inten-
tions and discourse about change, as to the effecting of change itself.
The implicated forms of agency are  not singular and controlling,
but complex and multidimensional; reflexively conditioning the
supposedly driving knowledges and motivations [59]. And the
frequently knotty contours in these eddying flows of agency [60],
mean that incumbency encounters many ways to subvert the con-
stituting of change. So, ostensibly novel ‘transitions’ may  readily
end up concealing what are in actuality, deeper realignments
with existing structures. In other words, the realised forms of
‘transformation’ may  be more discursive and superficial than
material and substantive. The more radical and challenging the
attempted transformation, the greater this propensity to subver-
sion [61].  Concrete examples (discussed further below), include
ways in which pressures for ‘sustainable’ energy transformation
driven primarily by interest in  renewable energy, might yield
instead, transitions to  nuclear power or climate geoengineering.
Seeking to effect social transformation is a Faustian dance. Power
is necessary for transformation, but this may  be subverted if power
itself is not transformed.
These are  thorny challenges – familiar in  colloquial discussion,
but curiously neglected in analysis. The present paper can grap-
ple only with a  few. Some of the more profound issues will be
returned to  at the end. For now, discussion will pick up in a  more
prosaic way. First, it will set the stage for discussing currently
mooted energy transformations, by reviewing the intimate general
relationships between ‘energy systems’ and wider social orders.
Then, it will turn to some of the entrenched structurings of  Moder-
nity – as a  particular social form – and the crucial place within
this of energy technologies (especially nuclear power). From here,
attention will focus on a  crucial way in which incumbent interests
impede transformation in this sector – constraining and condi-
tioning what counts as ‘reliable knowledge’ about possible energy
pathways. This yields some concrete findings concerning the con-
duct of social science in relation to  energy policy.
These findings will in  turn lead to an array of important wider
implications for general relations between science and democracy
as means to help effect substantive (rather than rhetorical) trans-
formation. The penultimate section will return to  the dilemmas and
contradictions of power and control sketched above – and urge a
more reflexive approach to their reconciliation. In the end, it will be
argued that real transformation in  global energy institutions and
infrastructures – like any radical social change more generally –
requires transformation in  the ‘knowing and doing’ of power itself.
Although quite general in  their scope, these conclusions underpin
a very specific set of practical political recommendations of  direct
relevance to the social science of energy.
2.  Energy and society
In  contemplating the magnitude of the current struggles for
global energy transformations, it is  important to recall – with other
papers in this issue [62–65] – that earlier realised cultural, infras-
tructural, political and economic transformations have also been
profound [66].  And easily forgotten, is that  secular rates of change
have also frequently been formidable [67,68]. Cumulative infra-
structure developments are often as formative in  their effects as
wholesale substitution [69]. But few previous structural shifts have
been as historically rapid or  socially pervasive as those now envis-
aged for global energy transitions [70].  Nor – crucially – have they
aspired to the same depth or extent of explicitly shared social
intentionality or  assertively coordinated political control. It is in
the associated discursive pressures to emphasise the need for (and
claim and appropriate) such control, that there arise the dangers of
the instrumental fallacies discussed above.
Challenges of global energy transformations, then, are not just
on a significantly greater scale, but  also arguably of a  radically
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different order to any previous deliberately concerted political
undertaking. It is worth reflecting on the empowering audacity of
this ontological novelty, before wringing hands too despairingly
over the oppressive difficulties bearing on current efforts to achieve
it. In the absence of deliberate reflection on this point, it is not just
political rhetoric, but the fabric of knowledge and expectations
themselves, that can become vulnerable to  expediency and
manipulation. For instance, many forms of anti-transformative
inertia and self-interest in  incumbent energy regimes [71], are
already impacting in deep and strong ways on understandings of
two radically contrasting forms of prospective global ‘transforma-
tion’ – respectively ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ with respect to
entrenched regime interests.
The ‘progressive’ transformation (reviewed further below)
would harness diverse proven viable global renewable resources
and innovations to  deliver energy services at the same time  as
eliminating carbon emissions and realising other Sustainability
benefits [70,72–78]. The alternative ‘conservative’ transforma-
tion, by contrast, would use an array of speculative technologies
and unprecedented global institutions aimed solely at assum-
ing human ‘control’ over the planetary climate [79–82].  Although
requiring economic and political investment on a scale similar
to that required for direct transformation of energy infrastruc-
tures, most forms of climate geoengineering would leave energy
needs entirely unaddressed [83,84].  Yet, it is this manifestly more
speculative alternative, that is  gaining strikingly increasing high-
level worldwide attention [85]. That a conservative transition built
around climate geoengineering is  thought in  some quarters to
present a somehow more tractable governance challenge to  a
progressive transformation based on renewable energy [86,87],
is an indication of the strength of entrenched vested interests
in this sector. Their asserted agencies are not just restricted
within a particular regime, but also leave an imprint on more
general patterns of policy knowledge and political expectation
[88,89]. The result is an especially pertinent example of the
kind of expedient fallacy of control described at the beginning
of this paper [39].  There seems here a  particular role  for social
science in facilitating more reasoned reflection on these issues
[90,91].
These are the kinds of issue that  arise in contemplating the
long run relationships between energy systems and global societies
at large. There is, however, a  need for critical caution. Hyperbolic
claims concerning energy and society are nothing new. Discussions
of energy futures seem especially prone to misleading simplifi-
cation and intellectual hubris [92].  So it is  worth asking before
proceeding, whether ‘energy’ really is  so distinctively important
as a lens through which to engage with wider social dynamics? Of
course – as mentioned above – the material significance of energy
in  society is longstanding [93] . . . and long recognised [94,95]. But
this is also true of other essential material functions in  human
life – for instance, around water, food and shelter [96].  Yet as
well as being profoundly interlinked [97],  the social specificities
of energy-related flows and structures in the contemporary world
are arguably even more formative and foundational than in these
other ‘sectors’.
Energy dynamics feature especially prominently in  many
understandings of past processes of structural emergence [98] and
‘collapse’ [99].  And it is  contemporary systems for global energy
provision, that are arguably most implicated at the grandest of
scales in “fuelling capitalism” [100], as well as in the most inti-
mate details of everyday lives [101,102]. The particular cultural
formativities of energy are thus distinguished not just in  the sheer
magnitude and imperative necessity of its diverse roles, but in  the
ways in which patterns and practices in production and consump-
tion implicate social agency and structure in  distinctively specific
forms. So,  it is perhaps in relation most to practises around energy
services that a  proverbial time-travelling Pleistocene human ances-
tor might arguably experience their most bewildering surprises
in the everyday materialities of social life across much of the
world.
Be  this as it may, great care must still be taken over many kinds
of ‘energy exceptionalism’. It is clear that disciplinary fashions and
privileges can help drive overly promiscuous recourse to energy
as a source of metaphor and metonym in social science. Energy
productivity is  implicated in  some of the most inflexible deter-
minisms and disabling simplifications of historical materialism
[53,103–105].  Energy is  arguably disproportionately prominent
equally in theories about cultural evolution [106–108],  political
ecology [109,110] and social action [111].  And with respect to  his-
torical dynamics and social orders in general, few themes are more
prolifically invoked than energy, as grounds for reductive deter-
minism or  essentialist reification [112].  Especially in  the language
of entropy, ambitious efforts at energy-based social explanations
are widespread in  anthropology [113,114],  archaeology [115–117],
economics [118–123],  agronomics [124],  industrial and social ecol-
ogy [125–128],  sociology [129], management [130–132],  politics
[133–135], the arts [136], history [137] and futurology [138]. If
anything, the problem is  more that explanatory potentials for
energy-based concepts in social understandings are overstated,
than that they are neglected.
3. Modernity and technology
But there exist more particular reasons for attention to  the
nexus between energy research & social science. These rest more
in addressing discursive, cultural and political attributes of energy
systems, than their general physical parameters. They arise in a
different aspect of the current historical juncture of energy choices
with which this paper began. For, it is also in  the energy arena
that narratives of Modernity have played out what is  arguably their
most formative dynamics [139].  Half a  century ago, the worldwide
rise of nuclear power provided a leitmotif for post-war Modernity
[140,141].  But more recent drastic relative decline in  global nuclear
fortunes offer an equally iconic disruption of this story [142].  There
is of course much complex detail in  many divergent settings. But
the bottom line is pretty clear. In order to appreciate this, it is nec-
essary to take a few steps back and consider the historical bigger
picture.
Technology in general is central to contested notions of
Modernity over the past century and a half [139].  In  a  stylised
‘Enlightenment’ account [143],  technological progress is presented
simply as an emergent outcome of incumbent social structures
and dynamics. Whatever innovations are produced under pre-
vailing patterns of power and privilege, come to be  recognised
uncritically as ‘progress’ [144].  Ignoring the manifest roles of con-
tingency, path dependency and channelling by power [145–152],
technical advance therefore tends to be defined in specific ‘sectors’,
tautologously and teleologically by reference to  those particular
configurations that happen to  arise.
Ironically, the hegemonic persistence of this ‘Whig’ [153] ‘myth
of progress’ [154,155],  is due in large part to the depth of its own
error. So irrevocably and ubiquitously have successive sociotechni-
cal regimes typically become entrenched (in areas like agriculture,
transport, communications, manufacturing and war  – as well as
energy), that  it is  difficult to imagine any plausible counterfactual
under which large scale trajectories might have oriented in  alter-
native directions [156].  So, the potent singularity of this ‘one-track’
‘race-to-the-future’ ‘Enlightenment’ imagination, is itself arguably
one of the prime forces in  this entrenchment [157]. In other words,
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the magnitude of the fallacy exerts a  self-reinforcing effect. It  is
against this background, that it can be seen that the history of
nuclear power presents a starkly disruptive picture, moving from
early success as a  synonym of Modernity [140],  to  later failure as a
potentially destabilising antonym.
Right from the outset, nuclear power has been more than just
one sectoral instance of a supposed ‘race to  the future’, pursued by
means of a single narrowly privileged technological trajectory. For a
long time, nuclear technology was in many ways emblematic of this
general syndrome [139]. Realisations of wartime military ambi-
tions for nuclear technologies were formatively horrific [158,159].
These engendered intense guilt-driven idealistic counter-reactions
in influential quarters of many scientific communities – around
beating ‘swords into ploughshares’ for ‘atoms for peace’ [160].
But the incentives also intensified, to  establish infrastructures
for nuclear weapons and military propulsion [161–163]. These
ostensibly contending cultural forces then in turn interacted syn-
ergistically to help nurture a vigorous early elite ‘nuclear discourse’
in many countries, in  which nuclear prowess became intensely
associated with national identity [141,140].
This potent cultural brew in  turn reinforced exuberant expec-
tations and massive institutional and material investment in  civil
nuclear power during the 1950s and 1960s. And it was  this that, in
many contexts, led nuclear power quickly to consolidate its status
as the most canonical exemplar of Modernity [140].  More mate-
rial path-dependent increasing returns also set in, to help channel
very specific technological trajectories based around design tra-
ditions initially optimised for submarine propulsion or plutonium
production [164].  Each was (and remains) equally poorly suited
to maximising goals of safe or economic civilian power pro-
duction [165]. It is  significant that these manifestly sub-optimal
reactor designs should persist and become so effectively irre-
versible within global nuclear supply chains. This is  especially so,
given that decision making processes in  this sector were claimed
(and widely viewed), as the epitome of synoptic rationality [166].
That nuclear power was  backed in this period by  such enor-
mous economic, political and cultural resources, should (on the
face of it) have allowed more latitude for escaping such closure
[167]. For such ‘lock-in’ nonetheless to  take place, then, sim-
ply shows the importance of contingency and power – even in
the most deliberate and concerted of policy programmes. This
alone is a highly relevant lesson for contemporary challenges
around climate change – where the burgeoning profile of climate
geoengineering raises (as mentioned above) potentially similar
dynamics.
Also of current topical relevance for climate change debates,
is that it was this same continuing general hegemonic profile,
that helped attract to nuclear power from the later 1960s, some
equally iconic reactions on the part of ostensibly ‘anti-modernist’
– or reflexively modern [168] – global social movements around
environment, peace and social justice [169].  As a  result, from the
1970s, the formidable discursive, institutional and infrastructural
stabilities hitherto accumulating around nuclear technology, suf-
fered a remarkable international destabilisation. Early processes
of increasing returns were countered by even greater negative
feedbacks, as defensive regulatory responses to political opposi-
tion revealed and exacerbated previously concealed diseconomies
[170].
These negative effects were then further amplified by a  suc-
cession of nuclear accidents – of kinds previously officially denied
even as realistic prospects [171]. Together with the increasingly
manifest intractabilities of nuclear waste management [172], these
forces were reinforced in  the 80s by a  growing intolerance for
concealed uncompetitiveness, fostered by a  new political econ-
omy  of liberalisation [17].  In short, over the space of just three
decades, the early ballistic ascendancy of nuclear power went into
equally meteoric reverse. Arguably in  no other area of the his-
tory of technology, is  there a  conjunction of such apparently rapid
and revolutionary global emergence, followed so quickly by poten-
tially equally transformative decline [173,174].  Discomfited by  the
misfortunes of this prodigal offspring, it seems in the energy ‘sec-
tor’  that the defining “one-track race” of Modernity first tripped up
[143,175].
4. Power and knowledge
In seeking to understand these mutually profound implica-
tions between developments in  the energy field and issues of
wider salience in social science, it is worth considering the spe-
cific dynamics around nuclear energy in a  little more depth and
detail. Of particular relevance, is  that they illustrate the crucial
roles played by incumbent patterns of power and privilege, not
only in  constituting social, economic and technical ‘regimes’ as
objects of scrutiny, but also in configuring the subjective social pro-
cesses through which these regimes are more widely scrutinised
and understood [176]. And this is  a  lesson not lost on those for
whom influence and stakes are highest – or who enjoy most privi-
leged access to  the means of this shaping. Few of these means are
more powerfully self-fulfilling, than the ways incumbent interests
configure ‘scientific’ knowledges such as to condition wider social
expectations over what is ‘realistic’ or  ‘unrealistic’ as directions for
technological change [177]. The overall, effect can be  a  powerful
circular reinforcement of incumbency.
The momentous energy choices with which this chapter
began, offer a  particularly good example of this. With climate
change now widely held to  present an over-riding imperative,
hegemonic patterns of knowledge in  other areas are being sys-
tematically reconfigured [178]–perhaps most notably with regard
to nuclear power. Problems of radioactive waste management,
nuclear weapons persistence and proliferation, chronic uncompet-
itiveness and periodic catastrophic accidents all remain obstinately
unresolved [179].  Of course, optimistic claims remain. Perhaps they
may  yet be borne out [180].  But the persistence of these chal-
lenges – each dating back to the origins of nuclear power – is
irrefutable [181]. Either way,  whether by deliberate agency or more
distributed realignment, it seems that the orthogonal advent of
widespread general concerns over climate change is  in  many ways
and quarters re-conditioning much more specific ‘scientific’ under-
standings of technical nuclear issues. Whatever the balance of
strategy and contingency, it is clear that tactical narratives around
a  prospective global “nuclear renaissance” are significantly rein-
forced [180,182].
The most conspicuous impact of these dynamics, lies in high
level policy debates over current energy choices. Indeed, the fact
of this being a  ‘choice’ at all is often exactly the point at issue.
Although the challenges of a ‘zero carbon’ energy transition are
undoubtedly ambitious and daunting, it is  clear that there exists
a diversity of possible pathways through which to address them
[183].  The obstacles to  an entirely renewable global energy sys-
tem are not  – as often claimed [184–186] – about intrinsic limits
on resources, technologies or economics [17,187–195]. Repeated
detailed assessments show that the energy service needs of  a more
heavily populated and equitable world enjoying radically higher
levels of wellbeing, can be cost-effectively met  (in dynamic terms
[196,197]) entirely and solely through diverse currently available
technological and organisational innovations around wind, solar,
biomass, hydro, ocean and geothermal power [70,72–78].
Though much room remains for argument over details, there
can be little doubt that transformations in global energy services
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based entirely around renewables are at least realistic in  the sense
that these trajectories are in  principle technically practicable, eco-
nomically feasible, socially viable – and so potentially historically
realisable. Indeed, it is precisely the anticipation of this prospect
that helps underpin the current ambitious commitment by the
world’s arguably most successful industrial economy, Germany, to
undertake the possibly globally catalytic ‘Energiewende’  [198–201].
Of course, the mere possibility of a  wholesale global move to
renewable energy does not mean that such a  transition is there-
fore automatically to be supported – still less that it will occur. As
with other essentially political ends in  plural societies, it is equally
possible legitimately to  propound (or contest) either a renewable
or nuclear-based global energy vision. Under contrasting values
and perspectives, either might be considered normatively desirable
– or on balance preferable. And – despite some intrinsic incom-
patibilities – there also exist many different kinds of diverse mix
[202].  But what is clear, is that the overall industrial, infrastruc-
tural and operational implications of broadly contrasting visions
for nuclear and renewable-based zero carbon energy infrastruc-
tures are so disparate, that real-world energy systems cannot be
optimised simultaneously around both pathways [203].  Despite
the latitude for diversity, then, there emerges significant scope for
social – and therefore political – choice.
This is where there arises a  remarkable further indication of
the effects of power on knowledge. For it remains the case that
in many energy policy debates (notably outside Germany), the
fact of this choice is frequently not only side-lined in the ‘evi-
dence base’ constituted by high-level policy documentation, it is
sometimes effectively excluded. Around the world, official studies
persistently present the achieving of a low carbon energy future
not as a matter of social choice across divergent options, values,
interests and preferences, but as a far more constrained and tech-
nical matter. In  the UK, for instance, a  historic fixation with nuclear
power is especially entrenched, exerting unusually heavy influ-
ence over central government policy [204].  This is surprising, since
the scale of nuclear generation in the UK remains relatively small
compared to Germany (both in relative and absolute terms) – and
the nuclear supply chain is far  less developed or  successful on the
international stage [179,205].  The UK renewable resource is  also
more favourable [76,201].  Yet  it is  in the UK that  nuclear inter-
ests seem to have  exerted some of the most constraining effects
on  national energy policy. That so much more progress towards an
alternative transformation should be made in a  country where the
success of the national nuclear industry might have been expected
to make this vested interest so relatively strong, seems a signif-
icant indication of the comparative quality of post-War German
democracy.
Be this as it may, it is informative to consider a little empirical
detail here. In a rapid succession of detailed UK Government anal-
yses conducted between 2002 and 2006, two early White Papers
unprecedentedly highlighted the feasibility and viability of strate-
gies based around renewables and energy efficiency [206,207].
Nuclear power itself was specifically identified as “unattractive”
(207:12;44;61). But  the leadership of the then UK Labour Gov-
ernment reacted by rejecting their own  commissioned analysis,
quickly convening instead a  third, more superficial, ‘review’ in
order to reinstate the nuclear option [208]. When this was itself
later overturned by  a  judicial review on grounds of various proce-
dural inadequacies [209], the Prime Minister remarked that any
such further appraisal “won’t affect the policy at all” [210]. The
disjuncture between the material actualities of choice and the
political construct of closure, could hardly be more stark. It  is
in  these ways, that  assertively pronounced expectations by pow-
erful actors (within, as outside, government), may  aspire to be
self-fulfilling.
Also revealing are the positions over this period of  the most rel-
evant senior officials. For  instance, UK Government Chief Scientist
Professor Sir David King repeatedly asserted throughout, an exclu-
sive and unqualified position summarised (in a  title for one of his
high profile newspaper commentaries): “we have no alternative to
nuclear power: if there were other sources of low carbon energy I  would
be in favour, but there aren’t”  [211].  On occasions when directly
confronted with evidence that, though he may not  personally prefer
them, viable alternatives do  manifestly exist, King would quickly
retreat to  an argument that nuclear is  still essential simply because
“we need to do everything” [212].  And when this somewhat non-
specific defence was  further challenged, to  the effect that a range
of diverse mixes might (if so chosen), also readily entirely omit the
nuclear option [183], the partisanship became even more evident
– in a  transparently teleological “we  need to keep the nuclear option
open” [213].
Again, this manifestly circular argument graphically illuminates
the way in which authoritatively asserted ‘scientific’ knowledges
can have  the effect of asymmetrically emphasising particular
favoured pathways at the expense of others. It confirms that the
obstacles to transformative change are manifestly more institu-
tional and cultural (and epistemic and normative), than they are
material or technical [214]. And this realisation in turn further
highlights the depth of the wider social transformations that are
entailed [11].  It  also underscores that  these are as much about
transformations of knowledges and imaginations about society,
as they are about modifications to the material world. For  social
science and political action alike, then, energy transformation
presents an especially crucial challenge.
5. Analysis and action
These are some key aspects of the momentous conditions
referred to at the beginning, attending the emergence of this jour-
nal. And it is on this basis that it can be argued that the significance
of these debates extends beyond the relevance of social science for
energy studies, to encompass the important ramifications of energy
politics for social science at large. So what do  these implications
entail most concretely? It  would be impossible fully to do  justice to
this topic in a  single article. Many themes are touched on in accom-
panying papers in  the present issue [215–220].  In  further editions
of this journal, a  diversity of wider repercussions will doubtless
unfold. For the moment, the present paper will conclude by  sur-
veying a  few of the more clear among the immediate challenges
highlighted for social research.
First, the underqualified expressions of energy expertise
reported in  the above UK case, raise a  general issue around ‘speak-
ing truth to power’. This is particularly acute for policy appraisal
in the energy sector, because this field has been especially impor-
tant in the development and application of prescriptive methods
in quantitative social science [221,222]. And the resulting bodies of
knowledge have in turn been particularly influential in encourag-
ing widespread conceptualisations of politics in  general as a process
of ‘rational choice’ [223]. Such thinking has most recently come to
prominence in  the worldwide spread of rhetorics around ‘new pub-
lic management’ [224,225] and ‘evidence based policy’ [226,227].
Yet across the underlying disciplines of neoclassical economics,
operations research and decision analysis, shared foundational the-
ory concerning exactly this kind of formal expert ‘rationality’ in
social choice, has actually earned Nobel Prizes by showing through
painstaking logical deduction, that its own  underpinning axioms
are significantly in tension [228–230].
In other words, it follows from precepts of rigour in  ‘rational
analysis’ itself, that there can in a  plural society, be no guarantee of
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any singular definitively prescriptive ‘sound scientific’ ‘evidence-
based’, ‘rational choice’ of the kind so prominent in the rhetoric of
many current energy policy debates. The point is  not  just that this
is difficult to achieve. The notion itself of a uniquely ‘science based’
decision, is actually an oxymoron. So, the resulting implications
are profoundly important for a  host of social science methodolo-
gies that are very widely practised in  policy appraisal in  the energy
sector. Risk assessment, cost benefit analysis, life cycle assessment,
multi-criteria appraisal and decision theory, are all seriously com-
promised by their own deepest understandings of their intrinsic
policy limitations [231,232].  The point is  not that these methods
are somehow entirely without value. They can still provide useful
information – for instance, as a  counterpoint to  entirely unsubstan-
tiated assertions like those excluding even reasonable possibility
of particular energy alternatives [233]. But  this value lies more in
opening up appreciations of choice, than in closing these down
[234]. When claims are made in energy debates (as elsewhere)
to a single exclusively definitive ‘evidence based’ decision, they
are (ironically and by exactly this claim) as plainly wrong as it is
possible to be.
What emerges in  turn from this, is that challenges of social
choice like those with which this paper began, are inherently
matters for explicitly political – rather than purely analytical – res-
olution [52,235].  More specifically, countervailing claims that  such
difficult questions can be fully resolved through calculative pro-
cedures of reductive aggregation or analytical optimisation are not
merely difficult to  realise in practice [235,236].  They are fundamen-
tally meaningless even to aspire to – let alone claim. What is needed
instead, where any political claims are to  be made to democracy,
are general qualities like openness, participation and accountabil-
ity [237] – themselves typically made possible and sustained by
active wider political mobilisation and robust critical debate.
In ways that are neglected in  policy discourse, this deals a
more general blow to  increasingly technocratic and scientistic
models for expert decision making in the energy sector, viewing
rational choice as a matter purely of prescriptive analysis, without
clear roles within particular policy areas for wider democratic
institutions, inclusive practices or political discourse. A  crucial
role for social science in this area, then, is  not merely to  find
ways to bolt itself on at the end of ‘multidisciplinary’ analysis in
order to inform the most effective implementation of some prior
ostensibly apolitically determined ‘evidence based’ energy policy.
A key contribution for all kinds of social science lies also in  helping
to inform – and catalyse, provoke and mobilise – more vibrant
political debate over the particular questions framings, values and
knowledges under which alternative courses of action look most
reasonable. As in more specific assessment methods discussed
above, it is more in opening up  room for such activity than in
closing down around particular asserted understandings and com-
mitments, that there lies the real contribution of interdisciplinary
social science in general [234].
It is admirable – and ironic – that the rare degree of reflexivity
involved in arriving at ‘impossibility’ results in social choice the-
ory, should be achieved in  a  field generally disparaged by other
branches of social science for a  lack of reflexivity [238].  It is
even more ironic, that the disciplinary communities who  are most
informed about these insights, should often remain so coy about
more publicly acknowledging the policy implications [239,240].
This leaves the door unduly open to the use of ‘evidence based’,
‘sound science’ language as a  cloak for much more partisan polit-
ical agendas like those documented above around nuclear power
or climate geoengineering. Either way, there is further important
message here not only for social choice theory, but also for other
branches of social science that have perhaps become complacent
over their own claims to reflexivity. Qualitative, interpretive and
constructivist social science (of a  kind well established in the study
of ‘energy regimes’) may  also learn much about being prepared to
admit more openly in  policy debates, their own  inherent limitations
– and propensities for self-interested institutional suppressions of
ambiguity and conditionality [15].
6.  Sustainability and democracy
Beyond analytical procedures, however, roles for democracy
are  also subverted in other broader ways in current energy and
climate policy discourse. General governance processes around
‘Sustainability transitions’, for instance, often display a  degree
of collective amnesia over the active forms of counter-power
that made such radical aspirations a  possibility in the first place
[241].  Historically informed social science has an important role
to play, in reminding how ‘Sustainability’ in general only became
elevated to  the highest levels of global governance as a  result
of protracted, radically challenging and overtly political strug-
gles by subaltern social movements [169].  As well as pioneering
many now-crucial organisational, technological and wider cultural
innovations [242,243], it was  these ‘counterculture’ interests that
maintained continual pressure for diverse but interlinked impera-
tives around enfranchisement, emancipation, equality, ecology and
nonviolence [100,244].
Yet – in energy policy debates as around Sustainability more
generally – it is  increasingly seen as self-evidently desirable that
these creatively agonistic, fragmented and unruly arenas for civil
society politics be structured into more consensual, integrated,
orderly agendas for carefully designed ‘sustainability governance’
[245].  In a classic ‘radicals dilemma’ [246], ostensible rationales for
this, lie in ‘pragmatic’ concerns over how best to  effect transfor-
mative social and political change [247,248].  Yet – as shown by
the early success of the Green movement (like sister movements
for emancipation of classes, ethnicities, slaves, workers, colonies,
women, young people and diverse sexualities) – there is an irony
here [249].  In all these areas, it is  in their more distributed and dis-
orderly forms that subaltern social agencies typically affect their
most formative influence [250,251].
In their more formally institutionalised forms, it is  particu-
lar organisations and individuals within these movements that
have often become susceptible to treating means as ends – pursu-
ing strategic visibility, organisational positioning and reputational
appropriation as proxies for earlier and generally more ambitious
aims. Of course, this reflects the paradoxes of power and con-
trol outlined earlier (especially with regard to knowledge). So,  the
‘radical’s dilemma’ looks correspondingly more weighted towards
co-option than challenge. Either way, it must at least be enter-
tained that the securing of credibility in  incumbent structures, is as
much about responsively ‘surfing’ flows of asymmetric agency, as
about proactively effecting more widely substantive transforma-
tive change.
This point is especially significant, since – explicitly or  implicitly
– much social science work around energy Sustainability has the
effect of substituting rumbustious, holistic, explicitly normative,
autonomous engagements by marginal interests [252], with
tranquil, neatly segregated and formally orchestrated procedures
of “polycentric governance” [253] – for instance in ‘global assess-
ments’ with narrow topical remits driven primarily by  experts
[254].  Where wider civil society is  involved at all, it is mostly
through engagement of ‘invited’ (usually elite) ‘stakeholders’
[255].  And where social science contributions are seen primarily
around this kind of instrumental delivery of ‘social intelligence’,
‘consensus processes’ or ‘deliberative verdicts’, there is  a  reflection
in qualitative form of the same spurious kinds of closure committed
in quantitative expert analysis reviewed above [234].
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All the more important for being side-lined by these pressures
for closure, then, a crucial role for social science emerges in rig-
orously setting out how all these processes – like knowledge
production more generally – are inherently socially and politi-
cally situated. And this illumination of how incumbent interests
can  come to dominate the formal codification of policy knowledge,
serves a very concrete positive function. It shows how transforma-
tion in the energy sector – like elsewhere – requires knowledges
that are produced demonstrably independently from incumbent
interests. This ‘independence’ is  shown to stand most firmly, not
in some romanticised single ‘objective’ position, but in  multiple
triangulations and counterpoints in pluralities of alternative
equally valid interpretations, each with their associated consti-
tuting conditions [256].  In addition to  offering a  more robust
basis for transformation, then, this ‘plural conditional’ approach
to  knowledge, also arguably offers better general prospects for
genuine influence by excluded subaltern interests [257,258].
This kind of active ‘opening up’ of political space is  dispropor-
tionately important as an active aim in  social research in the
energy sector as elsewhere – precisely because it is  social sci-
ence that shows how ‘closing down’ so often takes care  of itself
[234].
But the established emphasis of social science in  energy stud-
ies lies rather far from this. Indeed, the patterns of instrumental
closure discussed above sometimes penetrate most deeply, in  the
apparently most progressive of social research on ‘Sustainable
energy transitions’ [15]. It  is  remarkable, for instance, given the
diversity of political drivers mentioned above, how often the com-
plex breadth of “Sustainability” – canonically highlighted by the
Brundtland Commission around social equity, human and wider
ecological integrity [259] – tends to contract to a  single “low car-
bon transition” alone [11,260–267].  This ‘political pyrolysis’ of
Sustainability (a reduction simply to carbon), compresses the open-
ended, multiplicity of values and issues, into a  single ostensibly
one-dimensional technical metric [268].  And these processes of
technocratic reduction are even further compounded where the
plurality of possible ‘transformations’ are further compressed into
‘the’ (supposedly singular) ‘transition’ – a  closure further reinforced
by the assertive definite article [15]. There is little room here for
politics, let alone democracy. And the role  of social science risks
reduction to that of public relations [269,270].
This said, Sustainability in general, does in many wider areas
of international energy governance retain a  greater diversity of
dimensions. This is  the case, for instance, around the ‘Millenium
Development Goals’ process [271,272]. But even this potentially
more plural political space is  itself subject to powerful cur-
rent reductions. Despite efforts to soften the compression to
technical parameters alone [273,274],  the recent prominent ‘plan-
etary boundaries’ initiative in  ‘Sustainability governance’ accepts
only material metrics to qualify as defining the “operating space
for humanity” [275]. That this is a  technical – rather than
political –  domain, is emphasised by  the strictly delimited sup-
posedly “non-negotiable” status of these “planetary boundaries”
(276:31).  Insistence on “absolutely no uncertainty“, brooking “no
compromise” [277] reinforces the technocratic message, further
undermining appreciation of the scope for wider ambiguities,
trade-offs and contending values. So, the space for social science,
politics and democracy alike are  all seriously reduced.
To be fair, however, complexity and indeterminacy do  play
roles in this discourse. But, in a contradictory twist, the main ways
these are expressed are  as “catastrophic tipping points” [278]. By
asserting these with paradoxical confidence not as indeterminate
possibilities but as determinate “boundaries”, it is  as if they are
precisely known [275,276].  Thus are complexity and uncertainty
domesticated under an elaborated discourse of control. And the
space for politics is  further confined, by the impression that
these ‘boundaries’ render the Earth itself static and brittle. The
crucial political point risks being lost: that it is particular kinds
of human societies that  render disadvantaged people vulnerable;
that this occurs even under the most favourable of environmental
conditions; and that the most likely dynamics of transformation
lie in hope-inspired alternative choices,  not  fear driven technical
constraints.
Far from this, the ‘planetary boundaries’ discourse goes even
further in  homogenising human agency and responsibility. The
undifferentiated singularity of humanity in the central concept
of ‘the Anthropocene’, strongly undermines appreciation that  the
issues lie more in diverse and dynamic possibilities for alternative
different societies and economies, rather than in degrees of  techni-
cal compliance with supposedly fixed environmental boundaries
[279,280].  That the Anthropocene is also defined in terms of
‘domination’ [281–283] of the Earth by this supposedly seamless
‘humanity’ [284],  reinforces discourses of control and compounds
their de-politicisation. With latitude for political debate –  let alone
democratic accountability – thus even more seriously eroded, this
starkly imperative discourse fuels the desperate fallacies of  control
discussed above around climate geoengineering. Where ‘Sustaina-
bility’ is  addressed like this as a determinate technical end, rather
than as an empowering democratic process for determining plu-
ral human and ecological ends, then it betrays its own foundations
[268,285].
7. Social science implications
The key challenges presented by these developments for social
science seem clear. These lie in  moves away from defining Sustaina-
bility in general – and Sustainable energy in  particular –  exclusively
in terms of outcomes. Social research is as much about the pro-
cesses and directions of change through which understandings and
developments do or don’t unfold, as about any goals and end-points
in themselves. Crucial here is  a key neglected theme in Brundtland’s
original characterisation of Sustainability – emphasising needs for
“effective citizen participation” (259:16;58) and “greater democ-
racy” (259:16). This was emphasised not just as a  means to  decide
detailed modes of implementation, but to resolve the meanings of
Sustainability itself. If the social science of energy is  to take Sus-
tainability seriously, then this is  the sense in which it must be
meant. And if social research is  to claim any alignment with these
goals, then democracy itself – in all its many plural, ambiguous and
uncertain forms – is  not only a  central analytical focus but a  pivotal
normative commitment.
And it arises from the preceding argument, that diverse aspects
of democracy are as important in  the constituting of robust knowl-
edge, as in  implementing any associated actions. But this is where
a  further particular problem becomes evident in  social research for
energy transformation. In ways such as those exemplified above,
too much contemporary social science in this area invokes ‘Sus-
tainability’ as if the meaning were so obvious that it can remain
unstated. Similar non-specificity in  the advancing of interests like
‘sustainable business’ or ‘sustainable profits’, can lead to highly
instrumental manipulation [286].  So,  in the rush to effect a  sup-
posedly singular self-evident ‘Sustainability transition’, it often
remains under-explored exactly what ‘sustainable energy’ might
actually mean. And this is especially true of the plural social pro-
cesses through which the disparate meanings and enactments of
‘sustainable energy’ will be diversely experimented and under-
stood.
Of course – whether deliberately or not – much public engage-
ment activity in  the energy field highlights exactly these issues
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[287–289]. But it remains the case that this is  often quite inciden-
tal. Rather than seeking explicitly, systematically and as a priority,
to advance wider critical politics and democracy, much social
research for policy analysis in this field, restricts experimentation
in ‘public engagement’ to the securing of instrumental forms of clo-
sure. Yet more prominent than democratisation in many of these
initiatives –  especially in funding bids – are incumbent imperatives
to: justify decisions [28]; command authority [290]; foster trust
[291];  build legitimacy [292]; manage blame [293]; secure accep-
tance [294]; or even administer “sedation” [295].  So, it is  here that a
final normative implication for social science becomes most clear:
to help enable the more vigorous, equitable and inclusively crit-
ical democracy envisaged (for instance) by  Brundtland. And this
is as important with respect to  the meanings of ‘Sustainability’
itself, as to understandings of the most appropriate practices and
innovations through which to achieve it in the energy domain.
It is in these politics of knowledge, that social science in the
energy field – as elsewhere – encounters one of its own  deepest,
most intractable and distinctive features: the “double hermeneu-
tic” [296]. Knowledge in general is  socially produced. And this
includes knowledge about society and its energy possibilities. So,
alone among the natural scientific and engineering disciplines
which otherwise dominate the field of energy and Sustainability
research, social science is  distinguished by the fact that subjective
conditions of enquiry are not  only directed at objects of interest, but
also form part of that  object. And what this means in  turn, is  that
– without deliberate counterbalancing efforts – the social orders
that typically impact most strongly on the production of knowl-
edge, can end up as those that are  already incumbent within this
setting [57].
Recognising this, is  often uncomfortable. It can be especially
underappreciated in interdisciplinary initiatives, where their lack
of ‘double hermeneutic’ dilemmas mean that natural sciences and
engineering are typically able much more readily (though no less
spuriously) to pretend at objective detachment. And where social
science attempts to acknowledge this discomfort, the problems are
further compounded. Efforts at ‘opening up’ the implications of
alternative values and interests are often rejected as impossibly
inexpedient to decision making. Ironically, this can lead positions
that are otherwise most apparently positive about ‘natural reali-
ties’, also to be those most prone to  subordinating these ‘real world’
complexities and indeterminacies to politically driven simplifica-
tion and closure [256]. Even more ironically, it is rare occasions
where social science attempts to escape this politically driven bias
and closure, that it tends to be most criticised as inappropriately
partisan. Like iron filings in  magnetic fields, the contours of neutral-
ity in a world without objectivity, are taken to align with whatever
are the most powerful proximate interests.
Instead of challenging this, and explaining the obvious salience
of the double hermeneutic, much social science in  the energy field
seems to prefer to try to  don the same objectivist body language
as the other disciplines with which it is engaged. Economics, social
psychology, political science and sociology alike all often tend to
ignore the resulting conditioning effects of particular institutional
or disciplinary normativities on their own associated understand-
ings. The resulting knowledges are treated as if objectively synoptic
[297]. So, if there is an aspiration to  greater consistency and rigour
than this, then tacit denial of normativity must be replaced with
explicit declaration. Only in  this way, may  interpretive qualitative
understandings achieve the qualities of plurality and conditionality
highlighted above as also desirable for quantitative analysis. With-
out these qualities, social science may  itself be judged as further
complicit in the wider processes of attenuation of democracy.
This means that a balanced role for any social science that
seeks to be aligned more generally with progressive (for instance,
Brundtland-style) visions for democracy, lies not merely in
‘opening up’ understandings of the implications of otherwise-
marginalised perspectives [298].  The aim must also be much more
deliberately and directly to critically resist the forces of closure
[299].  That such a  balanced and reasoned aspiration in academia
should so often be caricatured as inappropriately normative, is
itself an indication of the salience of democratic aims. Rather than
pretending that  power relations have no bearing on knowledge
production, this explicitly and actively democratic approach simply
means being more rigorous about this indisputable social fact.
The essence of a democratic social science in  energy stud-
ies, then (like democracy in general), lies in constant struggle, of
multiple kinds, to counter these kinds of dynamic. Romanticised
notions of transcendent neutrality are manifestly fictive. Even as
aims, they are (through tacit denial of the double hermeneutic in
social understandings), potentially corrosive of democracy. So, the
point is not  one of striving fully or finally to eradicate what social
research repeatedly teaches may  in many ways be  intrinsic (or
unavoidably circumstantial or emergent) asymmetries of agency.
And the message need not  even be that a  particular concentration
of power is somehow inherently bad. The issue instead, is  that all
the many forms of power – and their associated kinds of  closure
– may  confidently be expected to  take care of themselves. So, any
broadly democratic purpose in  social research (as outside), lies not
in some particular notional outcome, but in  a  never-ending and
ever-provisional struggle to  reduce these asymmetries of  agency
as much as may  reasonably be achieved in any given context.
8. Reflexive transformation
Whether they are  agreed with or  not, the considerations raised
in this paper relate not only to  social research around energy sys-
tems, but  to  social science in  general. In this, the points made
here seek to  substantiate the argument with which this paper
began, that the momentous current circumstances bearing on
global energy choices are not only crucial in  their own right, but
also offer a potentially formative locus for addressing issues and
forces of much wider political importance. And these relate as
much to the configuring of formative knowledges about society,
as to the material constituting of society itself.  So, for any kind of
democratic sensibility, a  key problem lies in  the powerful general
pressures (documented here specifically in  relation to energy tran-
sitions), that can act to suppress serious discussion of these wider
and deeper issues and forces. Drawing on deeper themes in  politics
and social science, then, the paper will end with a  series of  specific
normative principles. These will be intended as heuristics, if not to
guide, then at least to  help catalyse and provoke more active and
explicit attention.
It will not escape the reader’s attention, however, that to  make
such attempts here at concrete prescription, seems to incur its
own contradictions. What of the earlier call for reflexivity? Does
this not compel never-endingly recursive qualification, in  contin-
ual regress away from clear positive implications for action? The
short answer is ‘no’. The analysis above pointed not to the suppres-
sion of normativity, but to the need for more explicit declaration –
even celebration. Criticising scientistic claims to singular definitive
objectivity, does not mean rejecting the taking of positions. Instead,
it was argued that reflexivity brings a  responsibility to  represent
knowledge and its implications in ‘plural and conditional’ ways.
And – in recognising how knowledge is shaped by power – reflex-
ivity also challenges the conventional sequencing of knowledge as
prior to  action. Interventions by social research concerning energy
transformation, are  (whether acknowledged or not) about political
action as much as about academic understanding.
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In this sense, prescriptive recommendations such as those
made here are entirely reasonable in social science. But they are
only reflexive in the democratic senses outlined above, when
they openly explore their own underlying formative epistemic
and normative conditions. In the present article, then, these
driving motivations have been explained to lie in  a  relational
understanding that substantive transformations in any given area
like energy, are possible only through the transforming of power
itself. It has been argued that this entails in turn a  commitment
to continual democratic struggle against the effects of concen-
trated power – in  knowledge as much as in more material social
structures.
So, this form of reflexivity is not some transcendent ‘vertical’
“virtue”, locatable in individual social actors [300]. As elaborated
elsewhere [301],  it lies arguably instead in  many horizontally
distributed social fields of turbulent relational flows. In short,
reflexivity is as much about action as knowledge. And, in  this
view, the social science of energy is – like other research –
a particular kind of social action. So, associated normative and
epistemic commitments (implicit or explicit) are not antithetical
to reflexivity, but – in appropriately democratic wider con-
texts – provide the formative (though ever-provisional) fulcra for
catalysing the counter reactions. Indeed, it is  this distributed, unco-
ordinated, agonistic but mutually co-constituting cycle between
commitment and reaction that arguably best characterises social
reflexivity.
The role for aspiringly transformative social research on  energy,
then, lies not in seeking to  court the patronage of proximate
power, by “seeing like a state” [38]. The analogy is perhaps more
with the dynamics of social movements. Here, the “strategic essen-
tialism” of campaigning organisations provides “the simplified
political representations that social movements must generate
to cohere” (302:5052,303). These may  sometimes amount to lit-
tle more than ‘civilising hypocrisies’ [304].  But  the associated
interplay of many kinds of knowledges, values and interests
remains explicitly situated in social action. It  is  arguably only
through this kind of dynamic, rather than the orderly structures
of ‘evidence based policy’, that diverse societies worldwide, may
truly hope to help catalyse the kinds of collective reflexivity
necessary for substantive (rather than rhetorical) global energy
transformations.
Returning at the end, then, to  the themes around power with
which this paper began, substantive (rather than superficial) trans-
formation is not – for reasons given there – achievable through
‘control’. The subverting dynamics of power discussed through-
out this paper, simply accentuate this. And the implications are
especially important for social constituencies that are as typically
marginal to incumbent concentrations of power, as is the case of
most energy transitions researchers. For these, the above picture of
the progressive potential of social reflexivity, suggests instead that
substantive transformation is better achieved through care, rather
than control [305].  And what specifically needs to be cared for, are
wider democratic capacities for scepticism, openness, participa-
tion, accountability and critical dissent [237] – such as to allow the
necessary transformative reflexivity to thrive.
Where action is acknowledged to shape knowledge, but
knowledge to constitute action, social science interventions are
accountable in both  ways – as hybrid ‘knowing doings’ [306].  And
if  the aim is substantive (rather than superficial) transformation,
then they should not seek to imitate the synoptic pretensions and
fictive aspirations of incumbency to  control. They are  best enacted
instead in more modestly subaltern ways, as ‘Trojan horses’ and
‘political judo’ [15] of kinds whose effects lie not in  their own
direct purported force, but in  the wider reflexive reactions. This is
like the flocking behaviour of animals, or the dynamics of culture
more generally – an arena for some of the most radical, rapid and
transformative forms of social change. So it is  arguably through
reflexively democratic ‘culturing’ of transformative change [307],
rather than by more ‘managing’ forms of governance, that gen-
uinely substantive energy transformations face their greatest
prospects for hope.
9. Knowing doing transformation
It  is in  this heuristic, reflexive and aspiringly catalytic spirit of
distributed ‘knowing doing’, then, that this paper is offered. The fol-
lowing recommendations are  voiced not as transcendent ‘evidence’
from supposedly apolitical ‘integrated’ analysis. Instead, they are
much more provisional, situated reactions to the particular polit-
ical dynamics in  which they are embedded. Whether as ‘trojan
horses’, ‘political judo’ or ‘civilising hypocrisies’, then, there emerge
a  series of concrete implications for the ‘culturing’ of energy trans-
formation. Though much latitude remains for interpretation, each
principle is conditional on the explicitly normative position arti-
culated earlier – in favour of emancipatory democracy as the only
genuine means to achieve progressive social transformation [308].
If social science is to support transformations of this kind in  Sus-
tainable global energy infrastructures, these principles may  prove
correspondingly important.
• The roles of social science in  interdisciplinary energy research, are
not just about the social complexities encountered in  pursuing
goals driven primarily by natural science or engineering. Social
research also assists in  framing priorities, questions and options
for these other disciplines – in turn informing its own driving
aims  and those of society more widely.
• Aspirations (still more, claims) to singular uniquely prescriptive
‘sound scientific’ or ‘evidence based’ findings are  as misleading
in the social science of energy as in  other fields. This is as true of
interpretive appreciation and participatory deliberation as it is  of
quantitative analysis. A responsibility not to mislead, confers an
obligation not just to  avoid, but also to  deconstruct these forms
of justificatory closure.
• So, social science should therefore not  only refrain from, but
actively critique, policy recommendations presented in  singular
prescriptive ways. Instead, it should convey to policy making and
wider political debates an explicit and symmetrical plurality of
social interpretations of energy alternatives, each equally valid
under different reasonable perspectives – carefully explicating
with each, its associated constituting conditions.
• And in  these interests of more balanced understanding, energy
social science should also interrogate the processes for clo-
sure in which it is itself located, which enforce the practices
of justification. This includes challenging how specific reduced
understandings arise of ‘Sustainability’, ‘transitions’ and ‘plane-
tary governance’ – and showing how these favour and suppress
particular political interests and implications.
• This in turn entails that social science in  service of  democratic
energy politics should be open and reflexively self-critical about
its own  subjectivities – whether these be shaped by  theoreti-
cal frameworks, methodological styles, disciplinary interests or
expert community values. It is a matter of rigour, then, that social
science should in this way help ‘open up’ (rather than ‘close
down’) the space for robust wider policy debate.
• Where values are openly declared, broadly democratic (rather
than merely disciplinary) aims in energy social science research,
must seek not only to reverse tendencies to closure, but strongly
to resist the shaping of knowledge by incumbent interests. It  is
thus a  matter of rigour as much as democracy, actively to  help
92 A.  Stirling /  Energy Research & Social Science 1 (2014) 83–95
rebalance marginal interests, redistribute privilege and enable
choices benefitting the less powerful.
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